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The foundations of probability theory go back to the sixteenth century, when Gerolamo Cardano began a formal analysis of games of chance, followed by additional key developments by Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal in the seventeenth century. The initial development involved only discrete probability spaces, and the analysis methods were purely combinatorial. The foundations of modern probability theory, with its measure-theoretic underpinnings, were laid by Andrey Kolmogorov in the 1930s.
Particularly central to the topics of this book is the so-called Bayes theorem, shown in the eighteenth century by the Reverend Thomas Bayes (Bayes 1763). This theorem allows us to use a model that tells us the conditional probability of event a given event b (say, a symptom given a disease) in order to compute the contrapositive: the conditional probability of event b given event a (the disease given the symptom). This type of reasoning is central to the use of graphical models, and it explains the choice of the name Bayesian network.
The notion of representing the interactions between variables in a multidimensional distribution using a graph structure originates in several communities, with very different motivations. In the area of statistical physics, this idea can be traced back to Gibbs (1902), who used an undirected graph to represent the distribution over a system of interacting particles. In the area of genetics, this idea dates back to the work on path analysis of Sewal Wright (Wright 1921, 1934). Wright proposed the use of a directed graph to study inheritance in natural species. This idea, although largely rejected by statisticians at the time, was subsequently adopted by economists and social scientists (Wold 1954; Blalock, Jr. 1971). In the field of statistics, the idea of analyzing interactions between variables was first proposed by Bartlett (1935), in the study of contingency tables, also known as log-linear models. This idea became more accepted by the statistics community in the 1960s and 70s (Vorobev 1962; Goodman 1970; Haberman 1974).
In the field of computer science, probabilistic methods lie primarily in the realm of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The AI community first encountered these methods in the endeavor of building expert systems expert systems, computerized systems designed to perform di cult tasks, such as oil-well location or medical diagnosis, at an expert level. Researchers in this field quickly realized the need for methods that allow the integration of multiple pieces of evidence, and that provide support for making decisions under uncertainty. Some early systems (de Bombal et al. 1972; Gorry and Barnett 1968; Warner et al. 1961) used probabilistic methods, based on the very restricted naive Bayes model. This model restricts itself to a small set of possible hypotheses (e.g., diseases) and assumes that the dierent evidence variables (e.g., symptoms or test results) are independent given each hypothesis. These systems were surprisingly successful, performing (within their area of expertise) at a level comparable to or better than that of experts. For example, the system of de Bombal et al. (1972) averaged over 90 percent correct diagnoses of acute abdominal pain, whereas expert physicians were averaging around 65 percent.
Despite these successes, this approach fell into disfavor in the AI community, owing to a combination of several factors. One was the belief, prevalent at the time, that artificial intelligence should be based on similar methods to human intelligence, combined with a strong impression that people do not manipulate numbers when reasoning. A second issue was the belief that the strong independence assumptions made in the existing expert systems were fundamental to the approach. Thus, the lack of a flexible, scalable mechanism to represent interactions between variables in a distribution was a key factor in the rejection of the probabilistic framework.
The rejection of probabilistic methods was accompanied by the invention of a range of alternative formalisms for reasoning under uncertainty, and the construction of expert systems based on these formalisms (notably Prospector by Duda, Gaschnig, and Hart 1979 and Mycin by Buchanan and Shortlie 1984). Most of these formalisms used the production rule framework, where each rule is augmented with some number(s) defining a measure of “confidence” in its validity. These frameworks largely lacked formal semantics, and many exhibited significant problems in key reasoning patterns. Other frameworks for handling uncertainty proposed at the time included fuzzy logic, possibility theory, and Dempster-Shafer belief functions.
The widespread acceptance of probabilistic methods began in the late 1980s, driven forward by two major factors. The first was a series of seminal theoretical developments. The most influential among these was the development of the Bayesian network framework by Judea Pearl and his colleagues in a series of paper that culminated in Pearl’s highly influential textbook Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems (Pearl 1988). In parallel, the key paper by S.L. Lauritzen and D.J. Spiegelhalter 1988 set forth the foundations for e cient reasoning using probabilistic graphical models. The second major factor was the construction of large-scale, highly successful expert systems based on this framework that avoided the unrealistically strong assumptions made by early probabilistic expert systems. The most visible of these applications was the Pathfinder expert system, constructed by Heckerman and colleagues (Heckerman et al. 1992; Heckerman and Nathwani 1992b), which used a Bayesian network for diagnosis of pathology samples.