Table of Contents
- Lesson 1
- Lesson 2
- Lesson 3
- Lesson 4
- Lesson 5
- Lesson 6
Operation ANACONDA was a flawed operation yet effective. This fight was the first great-scale encounters in the era of -2001 War in Afghanistan subsequently the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. CJTF Mountain’s use of the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) and the initial planning allowed for the successful execution of Operation ANACONDA.
Operation ANACONDA was the first operation in Afghanistan Theater, in which a large number of U.S non-Special Operations Forces were participating in direct combat actions. In the period of March 2 to March 16, 2002, approximately 1,700 U.S. troops were transferred and nearly 1,000 pro-administration of Afghan paramilitaries fought between 300 and 1,000 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters try to attain the control of the valley. The Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fired mortars and heavy machine guns from entrenched locations in the caves and edges of the mountainous territory at U.S. forces struggling to protect the zone. Maulvi Saif ur Rahman Mansoor, the Afghan Taliban commander led Taliban assistance to join the fight. U.S. armies had predicted the strength of the protestors in the Shahi-Kot Valley was approximately 150 to 200, later on, it was predicted that maybe there were 500 to 1,000 fighters. According to the U.S. forces calculation they had slaughtered nearly 500 armed forces during the battle, nevertheless, journalists pointed out that, they found only 23 bodies.
Some of the main lessons, which took from Operation ANACONDA, are classified into six categories, as described below. These lessons are based upon legal over-all values. For future battles and combined expeditionary warfare, the U.S. military needs to progress in the main six areas as described below.
Cooperative forces must make advance efforts upon the unity of expertise, combined command structures, onward-organized mutual staffs, and combined planning developments for expeditionary operations.
Intelligence perfect evaluations, prepared war strategies, and together arranged divisions and developments, which remain to be dangerous for fruitful combined war actions with the help of minor moveable troops, continue a requirement.
U.S. Combined military services require some progress in leading combined air operations in such kind of fights. Developments are required in producing a mutual understanding of combined strength service concepts, creating effective information systems and dual communications arrangements, as well as in guaranteeing suitable command and control of airstrikes in care of ground force operations.
U.S. armies in combat need satisfactory mission instructions, rubrics of engagement (ROE), and related fire limitations that give clear direction and use suitable controls during providing the force superiors the expert and liberty to perform their tasks.
Combined services must be completely armed in addition cooperatively skilled for future combat procedures. Many-sided processes with associates must be finely interpreted. Combined armies must realize the consequences for exercise, training, in addition, operational services.
Protection revolution should be followed with combined procedures, as well as understanding the air-ground collaboration down to the strategic level, clearly, remember—together with the parts of material and nonmaterial resolutions as well as dual working out the transformation.
In the beginning, the operation entered into problems. Mistakenly, American Forces entered in the middle of the valley, instead of the external side of the valley and they were caught in the Taliban’s danger zone. Luckily, the American forces gained the upper hand, visiting heavy dead on the Taliban armies and threw them out of the valley.
In the memoirs of ‘American Soldier,’ ex U.S. Chief Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) showed Operation Anaconda as a “complete and definite success,’ but one and only in which the innovative U.S. armed war plan ‘didn’t survive initial connection with the opponent.” General Franks’ offers the outline for the case study regarding Operation Anaconda, which was performed in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan in March 2002. The objective of this Operation Anaconda was to destroy the Taliban and al Qaeda services that had grouped in the valley subsequent their previous downfalls in the opening 3 months of the battles. To attain this goal line, U.S. commanders made a multifaceted and classy battle strategy linking a ‘hammer and anvil attack’ by the U.S. and responsive Afghan crushed militaries into the valley. This war strategy was undoing on the day one, when opponent struggle demonstrated violent than at the beginning expected and welcoming Afghan armies unsuccessful to carry out their homeless person into the valley, in that way leave-taking organized U.S. infantry armies to face the enemy by yourself. The achievement was accomplished when the U.S. Army substituted strategic components through calling on air attacks to effort with the ground armies to defeat in addition finish the opponent. Initially, the battle was planned as a 3-day battle strategy with light struggle, but the Operation Anaconda took a 7-day fight with forceful battle and was formally finished in 17 days. The Operation Anaconda, which continued from March 2-18, was fruitful because up to quite a lot of hundred opponent troops were killed and the rest of escaped the Shahikot Valley, sendoff it in the governor of U.S. and associated armies. U.S. military total eight casualties and over 50 injured. The victory was accomplished for the reason that the U.S. armed showed a capacity to adjust as performing the joint operation, in addition, up-to-date data systems to overcome an astonishing and tough contest.
By the end of the Operation Anaconda, from the Shahi-Kot Valley, the US forces and Afghan forces had successfully eliminated the huge number of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban existence. As compare to Al-Qaeda and Taliban, casualties The US forces had faced approximately 80 casualties, in which eight died and 72 injured. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had faced casualties range from 100 to 1,000.